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I.

Cluster Munitions*

The Convention on Cluster Munitions1 (CCM) seeks to reduce the weapon's propensity to cause significant humanitarian damage. Cluster munitions scatter a number of submunitions over a large area, enabling one sortie to destroy numerous targets. 2 When a
submunition impacts a target, its shell breaks into shrapnel that travels with enough force
to pierce armor. 3 The weapon has become a significant feature of the Pentagon's military
strategy: the United States has stockpiled at least 5.5 million cluster munitions that in4
clude a total of 728.5 million submunitions.
The inaccuracy and high dud rates of cluster submunitions raise concerns under IHL.
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) establishes standards for the
protection of civilians during armed conflict. 5 Generally, Protocol I prohibits weapons
that are incapable of distinguishing between military targets and civilians. 6 Failure rates
for submunitions range from two to thirty percent. 7 These duds have the effect of
landmines, with the potential to explode at the slightest contact. 8 In Laos, an estimated
nine to twenty-five million submunitions of those dropped during the Vietnam War failed
* Joseph Anzalone of Washington D.C. contributed the piece on the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
1. Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions, Convention on Cluster Munitions, May 30, 2008, http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/CCM77-ENGLISHfmaltexL_001 %5
Bl%5D.pdf [hereinafter CCM].
2. See, e.g., U.N. INST. FOR DIsARMAMENrT RESEARCH, THE HUMANTrARIAN IMPACT OF CLUSTER

MUNITIONS 1, U.N. Doe. UNIDIR/2008/I (2008); Mark Hinay, Operationaland TechnicalAspects of Cluster
Munitions, 4 DisARMAMEN.r F. 15 [20061, available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2530.pdf;
Thomas Michael McDonnell, Cluster Bombs Over Kosovo: A Violation of InternationalLaw, 44 ARsz. L. REv.
31, 42 (2002).
3. McDonnell, supra note 2, at 46.
4. Hiznay, supra note 2, at 18.
5. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 48, Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
6. Id. art. 48.
7. Hiznay, supra note 2, at 22.
8. See Human Rights Watch, Cluster Munitions a Foreseeable Hazard in Iraq, Mar. 18, 2003, available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/03/1 8/cluster-munitions-foreseeable-hazard-iraq.
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to explode-these submunitions have caused over 10,000 civilian casualties since the war,
with new victims every year. 9 Failed submunitions cannot discriminate between military
targets and civilians and therefore render cluster munitions suspect under Protocol I.
On May 28, 2008, 111 states agreed to final terms to the CCM after two years of
negotiations in an effort to prevent future humanitarian consequences from cluster munitions. 10 The CCM does not set a blanket prohibition on cluster munitions. Instead, it
creates a heightened sophistication standard for submunitions. The definition of a cluster
munition excludes cluster munitions that satisfy Protocol I by being able to "detect and
engage a single target" and that include self-destruct and self-deactivation capabilities. 1
The Convention provides guidelines for clearing unexploded submunitions, educating
populations at risk, establishing a victim assistance program, and enforcing the treaty. 12
The CCM permits states parties to "engage in military cooperation and operations with
States not party" to the treaty, a victory for participants who are also members of
NATO. 13 Article 21 of the CCM thereby allows parties to engage in military operations
and peacekeeping missions with non-state parties that have cluster munitions in their
14
arsenal.
The United States insists that cluster munitions are effective weapons "when properly
targeted and employed"' 5 and that the removal of cluster munitions from its arsenal is
simply not tenable from a military standpoint.' 6 But the United States "recognizes the
need to minimize the unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure asscciated
with unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions." 17 The Pentagon's new policy on
cluster munitions calls for the development of a new generation of submunitions that will
reduce the risk of collateral damage. Unfortunately, the new generation of cluster munitions is not scheduled to be available until 2018.18 The CCM became open for signature
on December 3, 2008.19

9. Hiznay, supra note 2, at 17.
10. CCM, supra note 1. See Convention on Cluster Munitions, Oslo Process, http://
www.clusterconvention.org/pages/pagesvi/vib-osloprocess.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009).
11. CCM, supra note 1, at art. 2(2)(c).
12. Id. arts. 4, 5, and 8.
13. Id. art. 21(3).
14. Some states that use or produce cluster munitions and are not likely to endorse the CCM are the
United States, Russia, China, and Israel. See Eamon Quinn &John F. Bums, U.K. Drops Opposition to Cluster
Bombs Ban, INrT'L HERALD TRIB., May 28, 2008.
15. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS:

KoSOvo/OPERATION ALLIED FORCE AFTER-

ACTION REPORT 90 (Jan. 31, 2000), http://www.dod.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf.

16. See id. at 90; Alejandro D. Wolff, Deputy U.S. Permanent Representative, U.S. Mission to the U.N.,
Statement at the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (May 27, 2008), http://
geneva.usmission.gov/CD/updates/0527CiviliansArmedConflict.html.
17. Memorandum from Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec'y of Defense, to the Sec'ys of the Military Dep'ts., et al.
on DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians (June 19, 2008), http:/
www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/d20080709cmpolicy.htm.
18. See id.
19. Miles A. Pomper, Cluster Munitions Treaty Announced, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N, June 2008, http://www.
armscontrol.org/act/2008_06/Cluster.
VOL. 43, NO. 2

NATIONAL SECURITY

931

H. Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic-A Test for the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act*
On September 26, 2008, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, handed down a judgment for over $400 million to the survivors ofJack
Armstrong or Jack Hensley, two American contractors brutally murdered by al-Qa'ida in
Iraq (AQI).20 The judgment was rendered against the Government of Syria-held liable
for the murders in a federal cause of action under the recendy amended Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) for Syria's material support to AQI. The recent amendment
is one of a series of congressional acts to strengthen private causes of action against state
sponsors of terrorism, dating to 1996. With an increasing number of civilians working in
combat zones, it is very possible that the number of causes of action against state sponsors
of terror will increase exponentially in the coming years. As a result, Gates v. Syrian Arab
Republic serves an important initial benchmark of the current state of the law.
In 1996, Congress amended the FSIA to allow civil suits by U.S. victims of terrorist acts
such as torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, and hostage taking, and created a
cause of action via a further amendment against "an official, employee, or agent of a foreign state designated as a state sponsor of Terrorism." 21 In 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the law only provided a cause of action against
individual agents in their personal capacity, rather than against the foreign state itselfforcing claimants to seek remedy under domestic state law, if available.22 The 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) amended the FSIA to provide a private right of
action against a state that has been identified as a state sponsor of terrorism. 23 The
amendment allows for recovery of money damages to include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages, and "in any such action, a foreign state
24
shall be vicariously liable for the acts of its officials, employees, or agents."
In Gates, Armstrong and Hensley were civilian non-combatants employed by a private
sub-contractor in Iraq, in September 2004, when they were kidnapped by AQI. AQI
leader Abu Musan al-Zarqawi murdered both men in grisly beheadings that were videotaped and later posted on the internet as a propaganda tool. Syria was found to have
provided material support to AQI:
Syria was the critical geographic entry point for Zarqawi's fighters into Iraq... and
served as a "logistical hub" for Zarqawi.... Syria supported Zarqawi and his organization by: (1) facilitating the recruitment and training of Zarqawi's followers and
their transportation into Iraq; (2) harboring and providing sanctuary to terrorists and
* This section was authored by Gabriel Lajeunesse. He is an Associate at the Georgetown Institute for
the Study of Diplomacy and is a career Special Agent for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The
views presented here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense
20. Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d 53 (2008).
21. Flatow Amendment, Civil Liability for Acts of State-Sponsored Terrorism, Pub. L. 104-208, tit. V,
§ 589a, 110 Stat. 3009,172 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)).
22. Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.D.C. 2004).
23. 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. 110-181, § 1083(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3 (amending ch. 97,
28 U.S.C. § 1605(c)).
24. Id.
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their operational and logistical supply network; and (3) financing Zarqawi and his
25
terrorist network in Iraq.
The court held that under the NDAA amendment, the Government of Syria was the only
defendant against which damages could be sought, a dismissal of state-law claims was required, but that Syria was subject to suit under the terrorism exception to FSIA. The
court awarded economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages of
over $4 million.
The court's application in Gates of the new FSIA amendment does not produce remarkable results, yet it is probably a harbinger for the future of this type of litigation. If material support can be proven, the state will be liable. Should the executive branch reverse its
trend of fighting private actions and rather choose to use these private suits as levers
against state sponsors of terror, FSIA could have an impact of not only compensating
victims, but also causing state sponsors of terror to recalculate the costs of their behaviors.

m. Pursuing.Claims and Accountability over Private Security Contractors
in Iraq*
The need for stronger accountability over private security contractors in Iraq gained
much attention in 2008, since the U.N. mandate for foreign troops in Iraq was to have
expired in December 2008, and the Status of Forces Agreement between Iraq and the
United States may subject U.S. contractors to Iraqi legal jurisdiction for violations of
criminal laws. 26 The Iraqi government's demand for jurisdiction over U.S. contractors
arose as a result of incidents involving contractors and potential violations of international
or U.S. laws. 27 And, in an effort to seek redress and accountability for these incidents,
purported victims and their families have filed numerous civil cases against the companies
and their employees in U.S. courts.
The Center for Constitutional Rights is heading two cases on behalf of Iraqis detained
at Abu Ghraib prison-Saleh v. Titan Corp. and al-Janabiv. Stefanowicz-claiming that CACI
Premier Technologies, Inc. (CACI) and L-3 Communications Titan Corporation (Titan)
25. Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 59.
* This section was authored by Carrie Newton Lyons. She is an Assistant Professor of Law at The
University of Akron School of Law and Co-Chair of the section's National Security Committee.
26. See Iraq: Whose Law Must Mercenaries Obey?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 21, 2008; David Isenberg, Emerging
Threats: PrivateMilitary ContractorsFret Over Iraqi-U.S.Status of ForcesAgreement, UPI, Oct. 31, 2008, available at http://www.upi.com/Emerging-7Threats/2008/10/3 1/Private-military-contractorsfretover-IraqiUSStatus of ForcesAgreement/UPI-43971225496635/ (noting that Iraq and United States were negotiating SOFA, clarifying terms for U.S. military operating in Iraq, including deadline for troop withdrawal and
legal jurisdiction over U.S. contractors; the Iraqi government demanded that SOFA subject U.S. contractors
to Iraqi criminal jurisdiction).
27. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ:

BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 11-14 (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/88030.pdf (incidents include shooting of Iraqi civilians by Blackwater contractors at
Nisur Square and firing at Iraqi civilians by Triple Canopy employees, possibly resulting in one death); Scott
Horton, Can't Win With 'Em, Can't Go to War Without 'Em: Six Questionsfor P.W. Singer, HARPER'S MAG.,
Sep. 30, 2007, available at http://harpers.org/archive/2007/09/hbc-90001311 (incidents include abuse by contractors of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib; firing at Iraqi civilians by Zapata contractors, undermining efforts at
winning Iraqi support for U.S. forces).
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and their employees engaged in torture; cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; war
crimes; assault and battery; sexual assault; negligent hiring and supervision; and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress.2 8 Plaintiffs in Saleh-consisting of
twelve Iraqis and the estate of one deceased Iraqi-additionally claim extrajudicial killing,
crimes against humanity, and wrongful death.2 9 Both cases seek accountability against the
individual employees involved in the alleged incidents and against the companies who
employed them. 30 The al-Janabi case received some additional attention because it involves one of the alleged "ghost detainees"-prisoners never recorded as detained and hid31
den away when Red Cross personnel visited the prison.
Similarly, a group of attorneys from Atlanta filed suit on behalf of seven Iraqis alleging
that they or their deceased spouses were tortured at Abu Ghraib.32 This litigation seeks to
disgorge from CACI and Titan the "profits derived from unlawful torture, to prevent
[them] from receiving faturc paymcnts under existing contracts with the [U.S.] government, and to prohibit [them] from engaging in future contracts with the [U.S.] government. ' 33 Furthermore, other lawyers are pursuing claims against Blackwater Lodge and
Training Center, Inc., and its affiliated companies (Blackwater) for the shooting deaths
and injuries of Iraqi civilians in Nisur Square on September 16, 2007. 34 The complaint
alleges that Blackwater committed war crimes and also pursues several torts claims, seeking compensatory damages and punitive damages meant to strip Blackwater of profits
3
earned from its alleged misconduct. 5
An obvious goal of these cases is to force accountability on the corporate entities for
their actions and those of their employees, especially since prosecution by the U.S. government has not been forthcoming.36 In August 2008, several Blackwater employees received target letters from the Department of Justice, indicating that indictments against
them may be on the horizon. 37 But given the difficulty of pursuing criminal cases outside
the United States, especially in a war zone, the best avenue for accountability may ultimately be the civil cases. Whatever the method, accountability should be demanded.

28. See First Amended Complaint, al-Janabi v. Stefanowicz, No. CV08-2913 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2008);
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56, 59 (D.D.C. 2006).
29. Saleb, 463 F. Supp. 2d at 59.
30. Id. at 56-57; First Amended Complaint, supra note 28, at 3,18-19.
31. First Amended Complaint, supranote 28, at 15, 8.
32. See Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 11 (D.D.C. 2005); R. Robin McDonald, Federal.Judge
Lets Abu Ghraib Suit Against Government Contractor Go Forward, FULTON COUNTY DAILy REP., Nov. 13,
2007.
33. See Second Amended Complaint at 2, Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., No. 1:04-cv-01248 (D.D.C. Sep. 7,
2005).
34. See Second Amended Complaint at 1-3, Abtan v. Blackwater Lodge & Trng. Ctr., No. 1:07-cv-01831
(D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2008).
35. Id. at 16-19.
36. Horton, supra note 26 (noting no Abu Ghraib contractors have been prosecuted).
37. See Del Quentin Wilber & Karen DeYoung, Justice Dept. Moves Toward ChargesAgainst Contractors in
Iraq Shooting, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2008, at Al.
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2008 Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act*

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)38 was enacted in 1978 in the wake of
the revelations of past abuses of electronic surveillance undertaken in the name of national
security. The Act provides a statutory framework for the collection of foreign intelligence
information, including through the use of electronic surveillance. Prior to its amendment
in 2008, FISA required an individualized warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for such electronic surveillance. To obtain such a warrant, the government had to establish probable cause that: 1) the "target" was a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power; 2) a facility was being used by that target (e.g., a telephone number);
and 3) the government was using minimization procedures to protect the privacy interests
39
of U.S. persons.
After 9/11, the Bush Administration ignored FISA's warrant requirement and secretly
"authorized the National Security Agency to intercept communications into and out of
the United States of persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations." 40 Following the furor over these revelations, the government proposed modernizing FISA to
allow such surveillance. This led to an extensive debate in Congress and the eventual
passage of the FISA Amendments Act in July 2008.41

The FISA amendment debate raised issues of fundamental importance: 1) whether
gathering foreign intelligence information through electronic surveillance that could compromise the privacy interests of U.S. persons should require an individualized probable
cause inquiry or whether a generalized authorization was sufficient; and 2) whether such
surveillance should be authorized by a court or by executive branch officials.
Section 702(a) of the FISA Amendment Act (FAA) permits the Attorney General (AG)
and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to "authorize jointly, for a period of up to
one year from the effective date of the authorization, the targeting of persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information." This authority is subject to certain strictures. Substantively, the acquisition may
not intentionally target people known to be in the United States, target persons outside
the United States with the purpose of targeting a person in the United States, target a
U.S. person outside the United States, or acquire a communication where all parties are in
the United States; it must also be exercised consistent with the fourth amendment to the
42
Constitution.
Procedurally, the acquisition must be conducted in accordance with targeting and minimization procedures adopted by the AG and the DNI. The targeting procedures must be
reasonably designed to ensure that acquisitions are "limited to targeting persons reasona* This section was written by Faiza Patel King, Director for Foundation Relations at the Brennan Center

for Justice.
38. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (prior to 2008
amendments).
39. Id. §105(a).
40. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTfvmES OF TE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/

surveillance9.pdf.
41. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) [hereinafter FAA].
42. § 702(b)(l)-(5). This submission focuses on section 702 of the FAA,- sections 703 and 704 regulate
acquisitions where the target is a U.S. person located abroad. Id. § 702(b)(5).
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bly believed to be located outside the United States" and prevent the intentional acquisition of purely domestic communications, and the minimization procedures must meet the
definition of minimization procedures in the pre-amendment FISA.a 3 Both are subject to
review by the FISC; however, if the Court finds the procedures deficient, the government
has the option of correcting them or suspending surveillance. 44
In addition, the government must, generally prior to surveillance, certify in writing to
the FISC that: targeting and minimization procedures and guidelines are in place and are
consistent with the fourth amendment; a "significant purpose" of the acquisition is to
obtain foreign intelligence information; the acquisition involves the assistance of an electronic communication service provider; and complies with statutory requirements. 45 The
FISC reviews the certification only to determine whether it contains all the required
elements."46
Finally, the FAA enacted "telecom immunity." Telecommunications companies that
had cooperated with the Administration's warrantless surveillance program received retroactive immunity against the various civil suits that had been filed against them for intercepting their customers' private communications. The FAA provided for the dismissal of
the pending civil actions if the AG certified that such assistance was in connection with an
activity that was authorized by the President between September 11, 2001, and January
17, 2007, was designed to detect or prevent a terrorist attack or preparations for one, and
was authorized in writing by the President.47 Such a certification must be given effect
48
unless a court finds that "it is not supported by substantial evidence."
In sum, the 2008 amendments eliminated FISA's requirement for an individualized warrant and replaced it with a system in which the executive branch can authorize
surveillance.
V.

Military Commissions: United States v. Hamdan*

United States v. Hamdan, the first U.S. military war crimes tribunal since World War II,
concluded on August 7, 2008. The future of Military Commissions is in doubt even
though Hamdan received due process that greatly exceeded the Nuremburg tribunal and
49
is comparable to protections received in The Hague.
Captured in a village near Kandahar, Afghanistan in November 2001, Salim Hamdan's
detention and litigation lasted for six and a half years.50 Prior to the start of his trial on
43. Id. § 702(d)(1), (e)(1).
44. Id. § 702 (i)(2)(C).
45. Id. § 702(g)(1)(A), (g)(2).
46. Id. § 702(i)(2).
47. Id. § 802(a).
48. Id. § 802(b).
* This section was authored by Keith A. Petty, a Judge Advocate in the U.S. Army and a prosecutor at
the Office of Military Commissions.
49. David B. Rivkin & Lee A. Casey, Justice at Gitmo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2008, at Al3. See also Those
Gitmo Surprises, CmncAGo TRIBUNE, August 16, 2008, available at http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2008/
aug/16/opinion/chi-0816edit2augl6 [hereinafter Gitmo Surprises].
50. David Alexander, PrisonerHelped Bin Laden Elude Capture: FBI, REUTERS, December 6, 2007, available
at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSN0620245120071207?feedType=RSS&feedName=top
News&page.
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July 21, 2008, Hamdan achieved several procedural victories, including a landmark Supreme Court ruling,S1 dismissal of his case for lack of personal jurisdiction,52 and a prisoner of war status determination under the Third Geneva Convention. 53 On the eve of
trial, however, D.C. District Court Judge James Robertson denied a defense request for a
preliminary injunction, stating that "Article III judges do not have a monopoly on justice,
or on constitutional learning. A real judge is presiding over the pretrial proceedings in
54
Hamdan's case and will preside over the trial."
Besides challenging the process, Hamdan was able to contest the reliability of his confessions, some of which the military judge deemed unreliable.55 In the same ruling, however, the military judge declined to suppress the accused's statements taken at
Guantanamo as long as the Government produced the interrogator that elicited the
56
statements.
Hamdan was charged with conspiracy 7 and material support for terrorism. 58 At trial,
the Government presented evidence-none of which was hearsay-that Hamdan knowingly transported and guarded bin Laden before, during, and after the 9/11 terror attacks;
transported weapons and ammunition for al Qaeda including two surface-to-air missiles;
and received weapons training. 59 The defense countered that he was not guilty and compared him to Hitler's driver who was never charged with any offense.
Ultimately, Hamdan was convicted of material support for terrorism and acquitted of
conspiracy. Controversy surrounded the military judge's panel instructions, which even
he admitted may have been erroneous. At issue was whether it was a violation of the law
of war for Hamdan, previously determined to be an unlawful combatant, to target U.S.
soldiers. The military judge answered in the negative and, as a result, it became a legal
impossibility to find that Hamdan conspired to kill "in violation of the law of war."
The six officers of the military jury (panel) delivered truth and fairness. 60 In fact, one
panel member later commented that the prosecution "was kind of like using the hand
grenade on the horsefly,"61 apparently adopting the defense argument that Hamdan was
merely a chauffeur. Ultimately, there was no evidence of a "show trial" that critics often
62
cite as justification for shutting down the military commissions.
51. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
52. Order Dismissing for Lack of Jurisdiction, United States v. Hamdan (June 4, 2007), http://www.icj.org/
IMG/HamdanOrder.pdf.
53. Ruling on Defense Motion for Article 5 Status Determination, United States v. Hamdan (December
17, 2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2007/HAMDAN%20ARTICLE%205%20RULING%2017
%20Dec%202007.pdf.
54. Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying preliminary injunction).
55. Ruling on Motion to Suppress, United States v. Hamdan (July 20, 2008), http://www.defenselink.mil/
news/Ruling% 20on% 2OMotion% 20to%20Suppress% 2029% 20and% 20D-44%2ORuling% 201%20(2).pdf.
56. Id.
57. Military Commissions Act, 10.U.S.C. § 950v(b)(28) (2006).
58. Id.
59. Referred Charge Sheet, United States v. Hamdan (May 1, 2007), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
May2007/HamdanCharges.pdf.
60. Gitmo Surprises, supra note 49.
61. Id.
62. Julia Hall, Eight days in Guantanamo: The Trialof Salim Hamdan and the DegradationofAmerican Justice,
BALTImoRE C=TY PAPER, August 27, 2008, available at http://www.citypaper.com/news/story.aspid=16213.
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The panel sentenced Hamdan to five and a half years confinement. Based on the military judge's instructions that he be credited with time served, Hamdan will complete his
sentence of confinement on December 31, 2008. The prosecution requested that the military judge reconsider his ruling providing credit for time served on the basis that Hamdan
"was independently detained under the law of armed conflict as an enemy combatant." 63
The motion to reconsider was denied on October 29, 2008.64
As Judge Robertson stated at the injunction hearing, "Justice must be done [in Guantanamo Bay], and must be seen to be done there, fairly and impartially." 65 To the honest
observer it was apparent that justice was done in United States v. Hamdan.66
VI.

Executive Order 13470: Restructuring National Intelligence*

In july 2008, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13470 amending 6 7 the

landmark EO 12333.68 The result of a long-rumored development process among the
White House, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the intelligence community at large, EO 13470 is aimed at modernizing U.S. intelligence activities
consistent with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).69 The
EO also is intended to incorporate lessons learned by DNI since the office's creation. On
the surface, the EO does not seem to alter DNI's authority, appearing merely to delineate
the specific responsibilities of DNI as provided in the IRTPA. But in reality, the EO may
well be interpreted to provide additional and significant powers to the DNI.
Enacted in 2004, IRTPA made the most significant overhaul of the intelligence community since the National Security Act of 1947.70 Among other reforms, IRTPA established
the DNI as head of the intelligence community, created an independent board to investigate civil liberties violations, and emphasized the need for cooperative intelligence-sharing
among agencies. 7' In short, the IRTPA reformed the fundamental premise of the intelligence community, supplanting the Director of Central Intelligence ("DCI") with the considerably more powerful DNI and effectively abandoning the compartmentalized,
competition-based model of EO 12333 for a cooperative approach. DNI outlined the
principles of this approach in its "Vision 2015" mission statement. 72
63. Peter Finn, Detainee's Time Served Is Challenged, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2008, at All.
64. Ruling on Motion for Reconsideration and Resentencing, United States v. Hamdan (Oct. 29, 2008),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/hamdan-sentence-order-10-29-08.pdf.
65. Hamdan v. Gates, 565 F. Supp. 2d 130, 137 (D.D.C. 2008).
66. Frank Harvey, A Silver Liningfor GuantanamoDetainees, GLOBE AND MAIL, June 14, 2008, availableat
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.200806 13.wcoessayO6 l4/BNStory/specialComment/.
* This section was written by Daniel B. Pickard, Matthew W. Fogarty, and Laura El-Sabaawi. They are
members of the International Trade Practice Group at Wiley Rein LLP.
67. Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (uly 30, 2008).
68. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. B 102.
69. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 § 6001, 118 Stat.
3638, 2742 (2004).
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L LN'TELLIGENCE, VISION 2015: A GLOBALLY NETwORKED AND INTEGRATED INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE, http://www.dni.gov/Vision-2015.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
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But IRTPA failed to identify many specific responsibilities for DNI. EQ 13470, by
contrast, identifies twenty-four specific authorities in addition to those granted in
IRTPA, 73 though many of the duties described in EO 13470 simply mirror or clarify those
delegated in IRTPA. For example, EO 13470 restates that DNI serves as principal advisor
to the President on national intelligence matters. Further, in addition to DNI's statutory
authority to participate in the appointment of certain intelligence officials, the EO gives
DNI the authority to recommend the removal of the DCI, as well as to consult on or
recommend removal of other officials. Moreover, as required under the IRTPA, the EO
stresses that DNI should consult other intelligence community leaders on certain matters.74 The EO, however, further amplifies this provision, outlining the procedure by
which agency heads can appeal DNI decisions to the National Security Council and, ulti75
mately, the President.
Nevertheless, certain elements of EO 13470 could reignite the turf wars blamed for past
intelligence breakdowns. Most notably, the EO gives DNI the authority to "manage and
direct the tasking, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of, national intelligence." 76 DNI may also appoint "Mission Managers" to serve as "principal substantive
advisors on all or specified aspects of intelligence." 77 In short, DNI has authority to direct
the intelligence activities of both CIA and DOD, which previously enjoyed largely autonomous authority on intelligence matters.
Further, EO 13470 authorizes DNI to establish and conduct intelligence arrangements
with foreign governments, 78 a responsibility historically assigned to the CIA's Chiefs of
Station. In 2005, DNI began appointing its own representative at certain outposts,
though in each instance designating the Chief of Station to serve in a dual role. CIA
officials had expressed concern that the EO would give DNI authority to appoint its own
representatives from outside the CIA, potentially giving other agencies a larger role in
CIA operations and relationships with foreign agencies. 79 While the EO does not directly
address this issue,80 its broad language suggests that DNI has authority to appoint representatives that, at least technically, would have authority to overrule the Chief of Station.
In this respect, EO 13470, while giving DNI authority to harmonize intelligence activities across the community, could complicate the mission by reviving the very turf wars
that DNI is charged with preventing.

73. See Exec. Order No. 12,333,46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,470,73 Fed. Reg.
45,325).
74. See, e.g., id. at pt. 1.3(b)(2); see also Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 § 1018.
75. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, pt. 1.3(c).
76. Id. at pt.1.3(b)(17).
77. Id. at pt.1.3(b)(12)(B).
78. Id. at pt.1.3(b)(4).
79. Pamela Hess, Agencies Fightfor Spy Control, USA TODAY, May 28, 2008, available at http://www.usa
today.com/news/washington/2008-05-28-spyagencies-N.htm.
80. Press Release, White House, Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on the Revision
of Executive Order 12333 (July 31, 2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/07/200807318.html.
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Recent Developments in Anti-Terrorism Sanctions: North Korea*

This section reviews key developments with respect to sanctions against North Korea
and certain entities.
In June 2008, the United States began to relax wide-ranging sanctions against North
Korea. North Korea had taken steps to open and dismantle its nuclear weapons program,
releasing a report detailing its plutonium production at the Yongbyon plant and dynamiting the cooling tower at the reactor. President Bush released a memorandum stating that
North Korea had not provided any support for international terrorism in the previous six
months and had provided assurances that it would not support future acts of international
terrorism. 81 Key developments from June 2008 included:
" Presidential authorization for the Department of State to remove North Korea from
the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Removal from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism would make impoverished North Korea eligible for U.S. support for financial assistance from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, among
other things.
" A Presidential proclamation lifting the application to North Korea of the Trading
With the Enemy Act (TWEA);82 and
* An Executive Order that ensured that certain restrictions, including property blocking, remained in effect despite the lifting of TVTEA sanctions against North
83
Korea.
Then, in August, the progress towards nuclear openness and disablement (on North
Korea's part) and sanctions relaxation (on the United States' part) was threatened. The
United States objected to North Korea's resistance to outside verification of disabling
efforts and stated that North Korea would remain on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea announced that it would cease disabling efforts and begin rebuilding
the Yongbyon reactor.84 By October, however, progress had resumed. On October 11,
North Korea was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.85 The Commerce
Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is expected to amend its regulations
86
soon to reflect this development.
* This section was authored by Eve Pogoriler. She is an associate at Covington & Burling LLP and
Vice-Chair of the National Security Committee.
81. Memorandum on Certification of Rescission of North Korea's Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 912 (Jul. 1, 2008).
82. Proclamation No. 8271, 73 Fed. Reg. 36785 (June 27, 2008).
83. Exec. Order 13,466, 73 Fed. Reg. 36787 (June 27, 2008). The Executive Order declared a national
emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07), citing "the
current existence and risk of the proliferation of weapons-usable fissile material on the Korean Peninsula."
Id.
84. Blaine Harden, N. Korea, Angry Over Terror List, Threatens to Rebuild Nuclear Program, WASH. POST
(Aug. 27, 2008).
85. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, U.S.-DPRK Agreement on Denuclearization Verification Measures
(Oct. 11, 2008), http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/northkorea/state/1 10922.pdf.
86. Foreign-made items containing just ten percent controlled U.S. content (by value) are currently subject
to BIS's North Korea trade controls. The amendment will raise the U.S.-origin content threshold to twentyfive percent. Certain export and reexport license exceptions may also become available, although many existing restrictions regarding, e.g., trade, property blocking, and North Korean vessels, may remain in place.
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Not all recent developments focused on the state sponsors of terrorism. In September,
the government announced a highly coordinated, multi-agency action against entities and
individuals involved in a worldwide network that sought to acquire U.S.-origin dual-use
and military components for the government of Iran and for Mayrow General Trading
Company (Mayrow). Mayrow was already subject to sanctions because of its role as a
supplier of components for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used against U.S. and
allied forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. BIS added seventy-five entities to the Entity List, as
a result of which they are subject to a general policy of denial for exports or re-exports of
items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).87 The U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of Florida simultaneously unsealed an indictment charging sixteen
individuals and corporations with conspiracy and violations involving numerous economic
and trade sanctions laws.88 And the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control imposed sanctions against six Iranian military end-users that bought the items from
those named in the indictment.8 9
VIII.

The Iran Divestment Act 2008*

On September 26, 2008, Congress approved comprehensive legislation against Iran to
deter it from proliferating nuclear weapons. 90 House Resolution 7112, titled the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act of 2008, provides for greater economic sanctions against Iran. 91 The legislation expands the Iran Sanctions Act to
incorporate industries related to oil and natural gas.

92

Broadly, the legislation expands export and import bans on goods to and from Iran;
freezes assets in the United States held by specific individuals close to or within the Iranian government; imposes liability on U.S. companies if they utilize foreign subsidiaries to
circumvent sanctions; empowers the Treasury Department with greater authority to combat terrorist financing; increases export controls on nations involved in transnational shipments of sensitive technologies to Iran; requires the U.S. Administration to report all
foreign investments of $20 million or greater in Iran's energy sector to determine if any
specific investment merit sanctions; and authorizes state and local governments to divest
assets in their pension funds and investments in corporations that invested greater than
93
$20 million in Iran's oil industry.
87. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce Department,
Government Partners, Break up Iranian Ring Charged with Procuring IED Components (Sept. 17, 2008),
http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2008/bis-press09I72008.htm.
88. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sixteen Foreign Nationals and Corporations Indicted on Charges
of Illegally Exporting Potential Military and Explosive Components to Iran (Sept. 17, 2008), http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-nsd-828.html.
89. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Iranian Military Firms (Sept. 17, 2008),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1l45.htm. These entities had already been subject to sanctions for
their roles in the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Id.
* This section was authored by Sheheryar Sardar.
90. Cyndee Todgham Cherniak, New U.S. Ertra-territorialLegislation Includes Tougher Iran Sanctions, TRADE
LAW., Sept. 28 2008, http://tradelawyersblog.com/blog/archive/2008/september/article/new-us-extra-territorial-legislation-includes-tougher-iran-sanctions/?tx ttnews% 5Bday%5D=28&cHash=a06425d4d9.
91. H.R. 7112, 110th Cong.(2008).
92. Cherniak, supra note 90.
93. Id.
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The Iran Divestment Act 2008 is a culmination of legislative developments during the
year. 94 It expands the definition of persons subject to economic and trade sanctions, including financial institutions, insurers, and export credit agencies. 95 Its codification and
expansion of indirect export and import bans is in accordance with the export prohibitions
enumerated in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 96 Most notably, the
Act requires the President to freeze assets of Iranian officials under U.S. jurisdiction if
such individuals are deemed to be involved in nuclear proliferation activities. 97 Under
previous law, the President could exercise discretion. 98 Similarly, the severity of penalties
arises in the context of commercial transactions, whereby a U.S. parent company will be
held liable to sanctions if it "establishes or maintains a subsidiary to circumvent" sanctions. 99 This restriction curbs the prior ability of a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company
to invest in Iran without violating U.S. law.' 00
The Act further authorizes voluntary divestment from Iran, subject to certain conditions. It authorizes local and state governments to divest from private companies that
have invested $20 million or more in Iran's energy sector. 101 The most striking change
affecting divestment is the amending of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to prohibit
legal action against asset managers who choose to divest. 0 2 Legislative intent enjoins
specific laws and mandates federal agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commis103
sion to ease the process of divestment and its disclosures without fear of reprisal.
The Act also strengthens efforts prevent the illegal diversion of sensitive technologies to
Iran. The intent behind this section is to identify countries of "Possible Diversion Concern." 1°4 The Act mandates U.S. assistance to those countries engaged in the transshipment, re-exportation, or diversion of sensitive technologies to an entity owned or operated
by Iran. 105 This includes strengthening export controls, coordinating data exchange, and
creating enforcement mechanisms. 106 If such countries fail to cooperate, they may be
°7
subject to additional licensing requirements.'

94. Sen. Chris Dodd (D-CT) and Richard Shelby (R-AL) announced wide support for the legislation in
July 2008. Press Release, Chris Dodd, U.S. Senator for Conn., Dodd, Shelby Announce Bipartisan Iran
Sanctions Legislation (July 15, 2008), http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?qN-de/4504.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. For example, Halliburton's foreign subsidiary, Halliburton Products and Services Ltd., lawfully conducts business in Iran. The Act would presumably make such conduct illegal. Lisa Myers, Halliburton Operates in Iran Despite Sanctions, MSNBC, Mar. 8 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7119752/.
101. Dodd, supra, note 93.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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